The missing link in drone debate

Viewpoint
Online issue # 27
November 19,2010

http://tinyurl.com/2b6vhtt


The missing link in drone debate

by Dr. Mohammad Taqi |
Politicians have been coerced by the Army to publicly condemn the drone attacks and parliamentary resolutions were used to indicate to the US the purported public outrage. However, privately, many are appreciative of the drone campaign

With about a hundred drone attacks this year and roughly two hundred since June 2004, in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, the discussion over this issue does not seem to go away. In fact, since David Kilcullen and Andrew Exum last year, Peter Bergen this year and Hamid Karzai this week, weighed in against the use of drones – at least under the current ‘rules’- the debate has only heated up.

Between 2004 and 2007 there were about ten attacks by the CIA-operated Predator drones but the number rose exponentially after George W. Bush commissioned the CIA to conduct action against the al-Qaeda and its Taliban allies in FATA. However, the covert nature of the program and the murkiness around the understanding regarding these attacks, between the United States and Pakistan , more specifically the Pakistani Army, continues to give rise to endless questions and myths. In his recently published book, Decision Points, George Bush notes:

“By the middle of 2008, I was tired of reading intelligence reports about extremist sanctuaries in Pakistan . I thought back to a meeting I’d had with Special Forces in Afghanistan in 2006.

‘Are you getting everything you need?’ I asked.

One SEAL raised his hand and said, ‘No, sir.’

I wondered what his problem might be.

‘Mr. President,’ he said, ‘we need permission to go kick some ass inside Pakistan .’

I understood the urgency of the threat and wanted to do something about it. But on this issue Musharraf’s judgment had been well founded… no democracy can tolerate violations of its sovereignty.

I looked for other ways to reach into the tribal areas. The Predator, as unmanned aerial vehicle, was capable of conducting video surveillance and firing laser-guided bombs. I authorized the intelligence community to turn the pressure on the extremists. Many of the details of our actions remain classified…”

This brief anecdotal section of Bush’s memoir gives some insight into the genesis, success and the criticism of the drone operations. The issues of sovereignty and the alleged civilian casualties remain perennial favorites with the Pakistani right wing and the international left. The common intuitive response to a foreign power’s actions in what is otherwise considered sovereign territory is usually that of condemnation but the militant menace in FATA significantly changes the equation.

Minds entrenched in the notions of Westphalian and international legal sovereignty are inclined to denounce, in a knee-jerk manner, any violation of the international geographical borders or presence of an external authority. While it may, prima facie, appear a reasonable approach but it ignores that legitimacy and authority – two key components of the modern concept of sovereignty- are not enough by themselves to support a nation-state’s claim to sovereignty. The sine qua non of sovereignty is the ability and willingness of the entity claiming such sovereignty to exercise control and establish its writ over its territories and prevent them from being used against other sovereign entities.

The Pakistani state’s de facto policy since the 1973 has been to use the FATA as the point d'appui for launching its Islamist militant proxies against Afghanistan . Faced with the post-9/11 predicament of how to preserve its jihadist assets – then on the run from Afghanistan- the Pakistani security establishment opted to use the FATA to provide such sanctuary. The Pakistan army had retracted its Taliban and Al Qaeda allies into FATA right after the Tora Bora battle and ushered them through Kurram agency into Orakzai and the North and South Waziristan agencies, where they thrive to date.

The traditional tribal elders-led Maliki system of governance however, was a hindrance in the movement, settlement and operations of these jihadist forces. The Pakistani state, therefore, aided and abetted the systematic elimination of the traditional power structures of the Maliki system between 2002 and 2004 and hundreds of tribal elders were killed by the jihadists. Territory and authority was either ceded to or held jointly with panoply of jihadists ranging from the Haqqani network in North Waziristan to local thugs-turned-jihadists like Mangal Bagh in Khyber Agency.

The operations against the US and ISAF troops in Afghanistan were planned and executed from the bridgeheads used by jihadists throughout FATA. Where the Pashtun tribes resisted the jihadists e.g. in the Kurram agency, the state sided with the jihadists against its own people. The Pakistani establishment literally created a Somalia-like situation in the FATA where its favored warlords ruled the roost. What that navy SEAL was referring to was true from his vantage point but it was important from the Pakistani people’s standpoint too.

While the ideological heart of jihadism throbbed throughout Punjab and its brains resided in Rawalpindi , its execution arm remained active in the FATA. Hundreds of bombings across Pakistan with the resultant death toll in the thousands were planned and launched from the tribal areas. On the face of it, the covariation between the Pakistani state’s proclaimed authority and the effective control of its territories remains nonexistent. But the state has actually been perpetuating a massive fraud on its people and the world at large, as it continued to remain in bed with the jihadists, who now exercised authority on behalf of the security establishment.

Under pressure from its military commanders in Afghanistan , the US political leadership had to act. But like the original anti-Taliban campaign of 2001, they tried to take the easy route and do it at a minimum dollar and human cost. Instead of openly confronting Pakistan they opted to press, appease and buy off the junta at the helm in Islamabad . What should have been a declared joint operation with publicized and documented status of forces agreement (SOFA) with Pakistan became a legally and politically tainted back-street gig.

Musharraf at the head of the army, as Bush notes in his book, was successful in scaring the Americans away from not only direct action but also to sufficiently muddle the venture, making it nearly impossible to evolve a public opinion favorable to drone attacks. However, not willing to risk a US incursion into FATA, Pakistan reluctantly acquiesced to the drones operating from places like Shamsi airbase inside Pakistan . But the buffer created by the absence of a (publicized) legal instrument of understanding between the Pakistan and the US outlining the parameters governing the drone operations has served the Pakistan Army well, while the Americans and the Pakistani people who support the drone attacks are readily painted as evil.

The Pakistani politicians from across the political divide have been coerced by the Army to publicly condemn the drone attacks and parliamentary resolutions were used to indicate to the US the purported public outrage. However, privately, many of the center-left politicians, including from the ruling parties, are appreciative of the drone campaign but are reluctant to say that openly. This attitude of the civilian leadership has weakened the case for pursuing the jihadists through drones or other armed means. It also sends a mixed message to the US military and political leadership who then tend to rely more upon the Pakistan Army.

A corpus of research- predominantly through the efforts of the Pashtun intelligentsia- has emerged over the last two years that debunks the myths of civilian casualties and public outcry in FATA over the drone attacks. However, to let the intellectuals do all the heavy lifting on this issue is somewhat unfair and also has its limitations. Without the political leadership taking a lead in shaping the narrative in favor of sustained action against the militant sanctuaries, the public opinion could be swayed with planted news and slanted views. We have seen that, despite claims to the contrary, the Pakistani mainstream media remains beholden to the Army and whether it is the Kerry-Lugar Law or NATO incursion over Mata Sangar, it sings in chorus with them. However, when politicians speak – on record – it is hard for the media and the world powers to ignore their concerns.

It is important not just for the US to hold the Pakistani Army’s feet to fire but for the Pakistani politicians to clearly state their position on the subject of drone attacks in FATA. Americans have the luxury to pack up and leave but most Pakistani politicians do not. They must seek a formal and public state policy on the drones operations preferably through the parliament. With the Pakistan Army’s reluctance to move against the jihadists holding the FATA hostage, the Predator drones remain the most viable option against terror. Only a bold political stance can clear the fog over the FATA skies; the politicians must speak up to regularize the drone campaign.